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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
We have the once-unusual case of a mortgage 
foreclosure brought in federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction.  The District Court granted a default judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff-Appellant National City Mortgage 
(“NCM”), and ordered that the property securing NCM’s loan 
to the defendants, homeowners Brian and Elaine Stephen, be 
sold at a foreclosure sale.  Following that sale, the Court 
granted NCM’s motion to set aside the sale after NCM had 
failed to notify The Chase Manhattan Bank as Indenture 
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Trustee (“Chase”), a junior lien holder, of the impending sale, 
a notice required by state law.  However, when Chase moved 
to vacate the set-aside order, the Court granted that motion, 
reasoning that the notice issue involved an independent 
question of state law and was not properly before it.  We 
vacate and remand.   
I. Background 
In May 2000, NCM loaned the Stephens $143,460 
secured by a mortgage on the Stephens’ residential property.  
About one year later, Chase, c/o Residential Funding 
Corporation (“RFC”),1 recorded a second mortgage on the 
property with the Monroe County, Pennsylvania, Recorder of 
Deeds, securing the principal sum of $51,000.   
We fast forward to November 2007 when, following 
the Stephens’ default on the NCM loan, NCM brought a 
foreclosure action in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania based on diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
2
 
                                              
1
 RFC was the then-servicer of the mortgage loan. 
 
2
 Even prior to the financial crisis of 2008, mortgage 
foreclosures in federal courts were not unheard of.  See, e.g., 
Land Holdings (St. Thomas) Ltd. v. Mega Holdings, Inc., 283 
F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2002); Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. 
Smith, 155 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Foreclosure 
Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Ryder v. Wash. 
Mut. Bank, 501 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Conn. 2007); Mellon 
Bank v. Pasqualis-Politi, 800 F. Supp. 1297 (W.D. Pa. 1992).  
Today they are much more common due to congested state 
4 
 
 Two months later, the District Court entered a final 
order of default judgment in the amount of $146,501.96 and 
ordered the property sold by marshal’s sale to effect the 
judgment.  NCM inadvertently failed to give notice to Chase.  
In March 2008, RFC, now known as GMAC-Rescap, 
assigned the servicing of the Chase loan to Dreambuilder 
Investments, LLC (“Dreambuilder”).3  No substitution of the 
servicer, nor its new address, was recorded with the Monroe 
County Recorder of Deeds.  In May 2008, NCM was the 
successful bidder at the foreclosure sale of the Stephens’ 
property.
4
      
 NCM had a problem, however.  Pennsylvania Rule of 
Civil Procedure 3129.1 calls for the foreclosing plaintiff prior 
to the foreclosure sale of mortgaged real property to give 
notice of the sale to, among others, junior lien holders.  As it 
had not given notice to Chase of the foreclosure sale, Chase 
                                                                                                     
court dockets.  Indeed, counsel for NCM informed us at oral 
argument that NCM brought the foreclosure in federal court 
because sheriff’s sales in Monroe County were backlogged by 
approximately 18 months, whereas federal marshal’s sales 
were typically held within four months of obtaining a 
foreclosure judgment. 
 
3
 Except where the context requires otherwise, we refer 
hereafter simply to Chase and not to any entity servicing its 
mortgage loan to the Stephens. 
 
4
 In foreclosure parlance, it “bid in” the property.  In this case, 
it bid the minimum—the sale costs—thus not bidding an 
amount that offset a portion of the amount owed to it as 
reflected in the judgment. 
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retained its lien on the property.  Cf. RTC Mortg. Trust 1994-
N-2 v. Fry, 730 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1999) (setting aside divestiture 
of junior mortgage lien because notice to that lienholder was 
insufficient).  Thus, rather than the typical outcome of NCM 
purchasing the property free of liens, its ownership would be 
subject to Chase’s lien.  So, on June 13, 2008, NCM, in a 
display of chutzpah to cover its own omission, brought a 
Motion to Divest Lien asking the District Court to divest 
Chase of its lien.
  
The Court dismissed the Motion, stating that 
it had closed the case after granting NCM the foreclosure 
remedy it sought and that NCM’s attempt to “have the court 
determine its rights vis-a-vis another party claiming an 
interest in the property . . . [concerned] an independent 
question of state law and [was] not properly before the court.”   
 Willing to be more practical, NCM next brought a 
motion to set aside the marshal’s sale, arguing that this would 
allow it to give notice to Chase of the new sale (thus giving 
Chase the chance to bid at that sale if it desired), and permit 
NCM to “realize from the land the full amount of its 
judgment and the purpose of the foreclosure action.”  The 
Court granted NCM’s motion to set aside without writing an 
opinion.   
 The story does not end there, however.  Chase—
through RFC and “its assignee Dreambuilder”—then moved 
to vacate the set-aside order, and the Court granted that 
motion.
5
  In doing so, it characterized NCM’s set-aside 
                                              
5
 NCM argues to us that because the assignment of the 
servicing of the loan to Dreambuilder was never recorded, the 
latter is not the lien holder of record, and therefore lacked 
standing to bring a motion to vacate.  As a fall back to its 
lack-of-standing argument, NCM makes two intervention 
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motion as “another attempt to address problems with the title 
created by the plaintiff’s actions in prosecuting the case,” and 
noted that these were issues of state law in which “a federal 
court has no interest.”  It noted that it had closed the case 
after providing NCM the remedy it sought, and restated that 
determining another party’s rights vis-à-vis the property “is 
an independent question of state law and not properly before 
the court.”   
                                                                                                     
claims:  (1) the District Court erred in failing to make Chase 
or Chase c/o Dreambuilder seek to intervene in the 
foreclosure action, as they were non-parties; and (2) even had 
either entity sought to intervene, that effort would have failed 
because neither was a party-in-interest under Pennsylvania 
law with a recorded interest in the foreclosed property.   
 
 We disagree on all fronts.  Chase is the party in 
interest regardless which loan servicer—RFC or 
Dreambuilder—handled matters as Chase’s servicing agent.  
Moreover, NCM brought its Motion to Divest Lien against 
“Chase Manhattan Bank as Indenture Trustee c/o Residential 
Funding Corp.” and “Chase Manhattan Bank as Indenture 
Trustee c/o Dreambuilder Investments, LLC.”  Chase in 
either form of identification was the clearly intended 
beneficiary of the District Court’s order in its favor 
dismissing NCM’s motion.  See Washington Hosp. v. White, 
889 F.2d 1294, 1299 (3d Cir. 1989) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 71 gives 
standing to non-party to enforce court order in its favor in the 
same manner as a party).       
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 Following the District Court’s denial of NCM’s 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for 
reconsideration, NCM appealed to us.
6
     
II. Discussion 
 A. Abstention doctrines do not support the 
District Court’s ruling  
 The District Court did not explicitly state that it was 
refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over NCM’s motion to set 
aside the marshal’s sale, but in vacating its set-aside order 
without ruling on the merits and reasoning that the issue 
concerned “an independent question of state law” not 
properly before it, the Court effectively abstained from 
exercising its jurisdiction.  This put NCM out of court.  See 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996) 
(abstention by district court “puts litigants effectively out of 
court” (quotation marks omitted)).  “We employ a two-step 
process when reviewing a district court’s decision to abstain 
from exercising its jurisdiction,” reviewing the underlying 
legal questions de novo but the court’s decision to abstain for 
abuse of discretion.  Matusow v. Trans-Cnty. Title Agency, 
545 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chiropractic Am. 
v. Lavecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
                                              
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
While the appeal was pending before us, NCM filed a petition 
for equitable relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe 
County asking that Court to determine the interests of Chase, 
RFC, and Dreambuilder in the property.  The parties inform 
us that the state court proceedings are on hold pending the 
outcome of this appeal. 
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 Although foreclosure actions are more common in 
state court, the District Court had diversity jurisdiction.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive 
of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different 
States . . . .”).  The homeowner defendants, the Stephens, 
resided in Pennsylvania.  NCM’s principal place of business 
is Ohio.  The amount in controversy was over $140,000.  
While the able District Court focused on the fact that the 
notice issue before it involved state law, that is not 
dispositive.  A district court with a case under its diversity 
jurisdiction almost always decides questions of state law, as it 
applies the substantive law of the state where the district court 
is located.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 228 
(3d Cir. 2005).  The question, rather, is whether the District 
Court’s jurisdiction here extends to resolving issues that arise 
from an error committed during the pendency of its 
jurisdiction over a marshal’s sale that it ordered.  We 
conclude that it does.   
 A federal court has a “virtually unflagging obligation” 
to exercise its jurisdiction.  Matusow, 545 F.3d at 248 
(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))).  It may abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction only when the “clearest of 
justifications . . . warrant[s] [it].”  Colorado River, 424 U.S. 
at 819.  Put another way, abstention is “an extraordinary and 
narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate 
a controversy properly before it,” and may be used “only in 
the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties 
to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important 
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countervailing interest,” and not “merely because a State 
court could entertain it.”  Id. at 813 (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. 
Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2009) (same).  
 Typical comity-based grounds for abstention are the 
following: 
Pullman abstention, an outgrowth of Railroad 
Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 
(1941), which is proper when a state court 
determination of a question of state law might 
moot or change a federal constitutional issue 
presented in a federal court case; Burford 
abstention, an outgrowth of Burford v. Sun Oil 
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), which is proper when 
questions of state law in which the state has 
expressed a desire to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public 
concern are presented; and Younger abstention, 
an outgrowth of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), which is proper when federal 
jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of 
restraining certain state proceedings.  
 
Trent v. Dial Med., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994), 
superseded by statute on other grounds (citing Colorado 
River, 424 U.S. at 814-16).  The first and third exceptions do 
not apply here.  There are no constitutional issues, and federal 
jurisdiction has not been invoked to halt state proceedings.   
 Burford abstention comes into play only when there 
are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import whose importance 
10 
 
transcends the result in the case then at bar,” or where “the 
exercise of federal review of the question . . . would be 
disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with 
respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”  Colorado 
River, 424 U.S. at 814.  For example, in Burford federal 
abstention was appropriate where Texas had established an 
“elaborate review system for dealing with the geological 
complexities of oil and gas fields,” and where federal review 
would “have had an impermissibly disruptive effect on state 
policy for the management of those fields.”  Id. at 815.   
 The District Court here was asked to apply 
Pennsylvania law on the equitable question of whether to set 
aside a foreclosure sale because of a mistake made during 
foreclosure proceedings.  See Kaib v. Smith, 684 A.2d 630, 
631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (decision to set aside a sheriff’s sale 
is an equitable one and “addressed to the sound discretion of 
the hearing court”).  “The trial court’s ultimate disposition of 
the [set aside of a sheriff’s sale] will not be disturbed upon 
review absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.”  M & T 
Mortg. Corp. v. Keesler, 826 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003).   
No overriding state policy or matter of substantial 
public concern is implicated in this case.  Indeed, there are no 
“difficult questions of state law” whereby a federal court will 
make state policy, and deciding the state claims will not 
“impair efforts to implement state policy.”  Colorado River, 
424 U.S. at 814-15.  In this context, the Burford exception is 
not in play.  See id. at 815. 
 In addition to the three abstention doctrines just 
discussed, Colorado River abstention covers the circumstance 
where the presence of concurrent state proceedings may 
11 
 
indicate that a district court should abstain from the 
“contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdiction[]” due 
to principles of “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard 
to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive 
disposition of litigation.”  Dial Med., 33 F.3d at 223 (quoting 
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817).  This abstention is even 
more rare than “the three traditional categories,” because, 
among other things, the pendency of proceedings in state 
court does not normally bar litigation in federal court of the 
same issues.  Id.  In Colorado River, the United States sought 
a declaration of its water rights in the context of Colorado’s 
water management scheme.  424 U.S. at 805-06.  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that, although typical abstention 
doctrines would not support dismissal by the District Court, 
other factors bearing on “wise judicial administration” 
weighed against concurrent proceedings in federal court, and 
thus dismissal there was warranted.  Id. at 817, 819-20.  
These factors were: 
the congressional policy expressed by the 
McCarran Amendment
7
 and . . . (a) the apparent 
absence of any proceedings in the District 
Court, other than the filing of the complaint, 
prior to the motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive 
involvement of state water rights occasioned by 
this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c) the 300-
                                              
7
 The McCarran Amendment (also known as the McCarran 
Water Rights Suit Act) provides, inter alia, for the joinder of 
the United States as a defendant in any suit “for the 
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or 
other source.”  43 U.S.C. § 666(a).  
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mile distance between the District Court in 
Denver and the court in Division 7 [the state 
water division in question], and (d) the existing 
participation by the Government in Division 4, 
5, and 6 proceedings.  
Id. at 820.  Noting the District Court’s “heavy obligation to 
exercise jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court stated that it was 
not deciding whether “dismissal would be warranted if more 
extensive proceedings had occurred in the District Court prior 
to dismissal.”  Id.   
 In applying these factors to our case, we note that the 
controversy has taken place almost exclusively in federal 
court, the state proceeding began after NCM appealed to us 
and has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal, and 
there are none of the complicating factors present in Colorado 
River.  Thus, Colorado River abstention does not apply either.   
 B. The District Court had ancillary jurisdiction   
 The District Court vacated its order setting aside the 
sale, reasoning as follows: 
[The motion to set aside the sale] appears 
merely to be another attempt to address 
problems with the title created by the plaintiff’s 
actions in prosecuting this case.  Such problems 
with title are an issue of state law, and a federal 
court has no interest in such issues.  As the 
court previously informed the plaintiff, this case 
concerns a mortgage foreclosure.  Plaintiff 
obtained the remedy it sought in this case—
foreclosure of the mortgage on the property.  
13 
 
The court closed the case after providing that 
remedy.  Plaintiff then purchased that property 
in a marshal’s sale.  Plaintiff now seeks to have 
the court determine its rights vis-a-vis another 
party claiming an interest in the property.  That 
question is an independent question of state law 
and not properly before the court. 
Despite closing the case after providing NCM with the 
foreclosure sale it sought and before NCM brought its first 
motion, the District Court’s ancillary jurisdiction extended 
until the completion of the marshal’s sale process it ordered 
to effect the judgment it had granted NCM.  As NCM’s error 
giving rise to the dispute took place before the sale process 
was completed, the Court had jurisdiction over the ensuing 
controversy.   
 “Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is . . . a creature of 
necessity,” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996), 
giving federal courts the power to enforce their judgments 
and ensuring that they are not dependent on state courts to 
enforce their decrees.  IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l 
Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 313 (3d Cir. 2006).  Ancillary 
jurisdiction is a common law doctrine that survived the 
codification of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 
(4th Cir. 2010) (“§ 1367 governs ancillary jurisdiction over 
claims asserted in a case over which the district court has 
federal subject matter jurisdiction . . . [but] does not affect 
common law ancillary jurisdiction over related proceedings”) 
(emphases in original) (quotation marks omitted); see 
generally Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354-56 (discussing the 
availability of ancillary jurisdiction after § 1367 was enacted 
but declining to extend it based on the facts of that case); 
14 
 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life. Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379-82 
(1994) (same).  “[A] district court acquires jurisdiction over a 
case or controversy in its entirety and, as an incident to the 
disposition of a dispute that is properly before it, may 
exercise jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case 
over which it would not have jurisdiction were they 
independently presented.”  Sandlin v. Corp. Interiors, Inc., 
972 F.2d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting 6 Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1444, at 316-
17 (2d ed. 1990)).  In other words, a court may exercise 
jurisdiction over related matters arising out of the case in 
which it has initial jurisdiction.  Holibaugh, 609 F.3d at 363 
n.2.  Here, the dispute over NCM’s alleged errors in sending 
notice of the marshal’s sale to interested parties is a matter we 
can easily say is not only related, but closely related, to the 
Court’s order of the sale.  We thus have no doubt it had 
jurisdiction over the dispute.          
 Chase is incorrect that the District Court cannot decide 
this controversy because its ancillary jurisdiction ended when 
the mortgage foreclosure judgment was entered in favor of 
NCM.  The controversy arose while the District Court had 
jurisdiction over the marshal’s sale, which it had ordered to 
give effect to the foreclosure remedy it granted NCM.      
 Chase cites to the doctrine that once a judgment is 
entered in an action, a court needs separate jurisdictional 
grounds to hear factually intertwined issues.  See Kokkonen, 
511 U.S. at 380-82 (declining to extend ancillary jurisdiction 
to an action to enforce terms of a settlement agreement 
because retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement 
was not in court’s order and breach of a separate contract 
requires a separate jurisdictional basis); Sawka v. Healtheast, 
Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1993) (district court has no 
15 
 
power to enforce a settlement agreement where it dismissed 
the case without retaining jurisdiction).  Here, by contrast, 
NCM is trying to deal with a flaw in the foreclosure sale 
process caused by its failure to give notice.  After 
overreaching in its attempt to divest Chase of its lien, NCM 
seeks to wipe the foreclosure sale slate clean and redo that 
sale correctly.  The District Court here specifically ordered 
the marshal’s sale of mortgaged property to recover on the 
debt due, and it needed to resolve disputes in that process.   
 In addition, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 
3132 provides that a court ordering a foreclosure sale may, 
“[u]pon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the 
personal property or of the sheriff’s deed to real property, . . . 
upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale 
or enter any other order which may be just and proper under 
the circumstances.”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 3132.  According to 
counsel for both parties at oral argument as well as an 
affidavit from NCM’s counsel, the deed has not been 
delivered to NCM. 
 The consequences of a ruling affirming the District 
Court support as well that it is the most appropriate forum to 
settle this matter.  The remedy NCM seeks is the set-aside of 
the foreclosure sale.  This remedy cannot be granted in state 
court without reversing the District Court’s order approving 
the sale and thus abrogating that Court’s disposition of the 
case.  Cf. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (suggesting ancillary 
jurisdiction extends to controversies where a federal court’s 
disposition of a case may be “flouted or imperiled”).  
Moreover, as we surmised and as counsel for Chase 
confirmed at oral argument, were we to affirm and the set-
aside issue later brought before a Pennsylvania state court, 
Chase would argue that the state court is powerless to set 
16 
 
aside a sale ordered by a federal court.  Counsel for Chase 
conceded it would instead argue that the only remedy 
available to NCM would be an action to quiet title.  He also 
agreed that the question in a quiet title action would be 
whether the marshal’s sale divested Chase of its lien because 
of NCM’s failure to provide Chase notice.  Where state courts 
potentially are prevented from granting a remedy otherwise 
available to a party, the district court (where the matter 
started) is the best place to decide these issues, especially 
where the problem arose during a property sale it ordered.  
See, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819 (rule requiring that 
jurisdiction be yielded to the court first acquiring control of 
property avoids the generation of additional litigation and 
inconsistent dispositions of property).    
 In an effort to preserve its leverage, Chase argues that 
we can affirm the denial of the motion for reconsideration and 
the order vacating the set-aside motion because the clear 
consequence of failure to give notice to a junior lien holder is 
that the junior lien is not discharged by the sale and the 
purchaser takes the property subject to the lien.  But this does 
not address the issue presented here—whether equity calls for 
putting aside the sale.  See, e.g., First E. Bank, N.A. v. 
Campstead, Inc., 637 A.2d 1364, 1367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) 
(Olszewski, J., concurring) (agreeing that sale should be set 
aside upon motion of the party inadequately notified where 
proper notice was not given and adding that Pennsylvania 
rules of civil procedure should be interpreted “liberally . . . to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action or proceeding to which they are applicable”) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Pennsylvania courts sometimes 
grant requests to set aside a sale and sometimes do not, 
depending on the evidence presented by the parties.  Compare 
17 
 
Gambler v. Huyett, 679 A.2d 831, 834-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996) (where parties can be returned to the same positions 
they held prior to the sale, court may set aside the sale where 
there was a defect in the notice procedure because this cures 
any prejudice to the party that did not receive the notice), with 
Nat’l Penn Bank v. Shaffer, 672 A.2d 326, 329-330 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1996) (sale does not necessarily have to be vacated 
if the mistake is the fault of the petitioning party who is a 
sophisticated financial lender whose counsel made a mistake 
of law and overbid at the sale, erroneously believing the sale 
would discharge the senior lender).
8
  The record here is too 
incomplete for us to decide the merits of the motion, and thus 
we remand for the District Court to oversee the completion of 
that record and to decide whether a “do-over” is called for.  
All we decide is that it cannot deny that do-over on, in effect, 
abstention grounds.  See, e.g., Kelsey-Barber Corp. v. 
Campbell, 381 A.2d 938, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) 
(remanding grant of set-aside petition for further “completion 
                                              
8
 The Court in Shaffer refused to set aside the sale in part 
because the parties could not be returned to the position they 
held at the time of the sale where the identity of a third party 
bidder at the initial sale was unknown, and the Court did not 
want to speculate whether this person would bid at a second 
sale.  Id.  The Court also noted that the parties did not contest 
the validity of the sale proceedings nor allege “any 
deficiencies pertaining to . . . notice.”  Id. at 329.  Though 
Gambler appears to be more pertinent to the facts in our case, 
equity calls for full factual findings rather than our 
speculation.  In any event, the burden is on the proponent of 
the set-aside petition to show that the circumstances warrant 
relief.  GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Buchanan, 929 A.2d 1164, 
1167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).        
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of the record” where there was an inadequate basis for the 
lower court reaching its conclusion).      
* * * * * 
 What happened here was the filing in federal court of a 
foreclosure action that traditionally is handled in state court.  
When matters became sticky before the marshal’s sale was 
complete under state law, the District Court in effect 
abstained from deciding those contested matters.  It should 
not have done so, for once it had jurisdiction and had acted, it 
had the duty not to fall back when unanticipated issues 
relating to the foreclosure sale process arose.  We thus vacate 
and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
 
